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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
GEORGE DAVID MELLEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
15528 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with two first degree felonies, 
Aggravated Kidnapping and Aggravated Sexual Assault. The 
appellant pled not guilty, and relied on the defense of insanity 
at the time the crime was committed. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty on both charges by a 
jury at a trial held on October 11 and 12, 1977, in the Third 
District Court, before the Honorable Jay E. Banks. The 
appellant was sentenced on each count to an indeterminate term 
in the Utah State Prison of not less than five years nor more 
than life, the sentences to run concurrently. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an affirmance of the 
conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are not contested. 
The victim testified that while she was walking in the 
downtown area of Salt Lake City on Sunday, March 13, 
1977, the appellant approached her in his car and asked 
if she needed a ride home (R.89,93,112). She refused 
the ride, but in the course of the conversation, the 
appellant took her by the hand and pulled her into his 
car and proceeded out into the traffic (R.93). After 
a misunderstanding as to the victim's address, the 
appellant located the victim's apartment, but instead 
of letting her disembark, made a U-turn and at about 
the same time grabbed the victim by the throat and pushed 
her head down into his lap (R.97,98,113). After threaten-
ing her life if she caused trouble, he commanded her to 
perform sodomy on him while he drove (R.99,113). At one 
point the victim tried to force the car out of control and 
make an escape, but was subdued by the appellant (R.100). 
During the course of the act, the appellant partially 
undressed the victim and fondled her breasts and vagina 
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(R.101,113). The appellant released the victim near 
her home and warned her not to report the occurence to 
the police (R.103). 
The appellant was arrested on May 4, 1977 (R. 
114). On July 18, 1977, the appellant made a confession 
to the Salt Lake City Police Department (R.109-113). 
The defense at trial was insanity at the time 
he committed the act. Both the appellant and the State 
presented expert testimony as to the appellant's sanity. 
Dr. James Whitten testified for the appellant and offered 
his opinion, based on his court-ordered examination of the 
appellant in August, 1977, that the appellant was a chronic 
paranoid schizophrenic (R.125,126), and that he lacked 
capacity at the time the crime was committed (R.130). 
The State presented Dr. Van Austin, who testified that 
based on numerous tests and examinations made while the 
appellant was at the Utah State Hospital during June, 1977, 
the appellant was not mentally ill at that time or in 
March, 1977 (R.201,202). 
The appellant's proffers of lay testimony as 
to the appellant's sanity several months after the trial 
were excluded by the court as being too remote, and 
therefore not probative or material (R.174). The court 
acknowledged that a lay person can give an opinion as 
-3-
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to the mental state of an individual, if the testimony 
would be material to the issues (R.167). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A TRIAL JUDGE MAY EXAMINE A WITNESS FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF ELICITING FACTS MATERIAL TO THE CASE AT BAR. 
The appellant's sole defense in the case at 
bar was that he was insane at the time he committed the 
acts for which he has been convicted. During the course 
of the appellant's case in chief, he presented as a wit-
ness Dr. James Whitten, a psychiatrist appointed by the 
court (R.131-147). Based upon his examination of the 
appellant conducted five months after the crime had been 
committed, Dr. Whitten concluded that the appellant was 
a paranoid schizophrenic (R.126). The witness was 
examined at some length by both attorneys, and at the 
conclusion of the appellant's redirect, the trial judge 
asked the witness the following six questions: 
"THE COURT: I take it, Doctor, 
that you make your diagnosis of the 
mental state of an individual based 
on his behavior pattern at a certain 
time as to what he says and what he 
does and your experience, is that 
correct? 
-4-
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A. That's correct, mostly 
his thinking at that time. 
THE COURT: So, if we were to 
look back to March the 13th, what 
he says and does at that time 
would be his behaviorial pattern, 
and that's what you'd have to base 
your opinion on? 
A. I would--that's true. 
THE COURT: And schizophrenic 
goes in cycles, does it not? 
A. Characteristically. 
THE COURT: Characteristically 
and they are responsible at times, 
is that correct? 
A. Quite. 
THE COURT: And at times they do 
know the difference between right and 
wrong and can choose the right from the 
wrong? 
A. Absolutely so. 
THE COURT: So, it depends upon the 
behavior pattern at a particular time that 
you're trying to examine as to whether or 
nor he would be responsible? 
A. That's correct." (R.150, lines 
2-27.) 
The Utah Supreme Court, in an often cited 
case, recognized that "a trial judge is within his rights 
in asking questions for the purpose of eliciting the 
truth or to clear up an obscurity," and that the trial 
judge "is more than a mere moderator or referee." State v. 
Gleason, 40 P.2d 222 at 227, 86 Utah 2d 26 at 37 (1935). In 
State v. Tuggle, 501 P.2d 636 at 637 (Utah 1972), the 
Court referred to People v. Harris, 198 P.2d 60 at 65, 
87 Cal.App.2d 818 (1948), and quoted as follows: 
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"[T]he law does not require 
the judge to maintain a sphinx-
like attitude and merely to 
announce his decision upon mooted 
points. On the contrary, he must 
see to it that no factual issue is 
left in a fog when by proper state-
ment or inquiry the testimony might 
be made clear. His primary duty is 
to see that justice is administered, 
and this cannot under all circumstances 
be done by silence and inaction in the 
presence of a controversy •••• " 
Dr. Whitten had testified for quite some time, 
and as the judge indicated (R.178), he intended his 
questions to serve as a means to summarize the Doctor's 
testimony by directing it to the issue at trial. Although 
the effect of the judge's questions cannot be controlled 
by his intentions, his questions were material to the single 
issue at trial. It is important to note that the judge did 
not indicate his opinion as to the guilt or innocence of 
the accused by the manner in which he phrased the questions. 
State v. Green, 57 P.2d 750, 89 Utah 437 (1936). He did not 
address himself in a manner designed to make the witness 
change his testimony, or to attack his credibility. Nor was 
his questioning so extensive as to convey any impression of 
his opinion to the jury. 
The Alaska Supreme Court, citing State v. Gleason, 
supra, with approval in Marrone v. State, 359 P.2d 9.69 
-6- J 
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(Alaska 1961), stated at 986 that since "[A]ppellant 
does not claim that the trial judge indicated by his physical 
demeanor any bias, prejudice or opinion, and we assume, there-
fore, that there was nothing objectionable in his expression, 
inflection of voice, or manner of propounding the questions." 
At the conclusion of the trial, the judge instructed 
the jury that they should not be influenced by any statement 
made or act done by the court; and furthermore, that it is 
immaterial to their decision what the court thinks (R.30). 
The trial judge acted within reasonable bounds in asking the 
questions, and was acting within the scope of the rule laid 
down in Gleason, supra. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ACTED PROPERLY IN EXCLUDING THE 
PROFFERED TESTIMONY AS BEING TOO REMOTE IN TIME TO THE 
ACT CHARGED, AND BEING IMMATERIAL AS TO THE APPELLANT'S 
SANITY ON MARCH 13, 1977. 
It is commonly recognized that a lay witness 
can, under proper circumstances, give his opinion as to 
the sanity of a person at a particular point in time. 
State v. Robinson, 408 P.2d 29, 99 Ariz. 241 (1965); State 
v. Odell, 227 P.2d 710, 38 Wash.2d 4 (1951). However, in 
cases where non-expert witnesses have been allowed to offer 
their opinion as to the sanity of a party, their observations 
-7-
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of the party have been made either shortly before, during 
or after the act, or based on a long and continued 
acquaintance with the party. The witness' opinion must 
be based on his personal observation of the person, and 
the observation must have the requisite proximity in time 
to the act to move the court to receive it. People v. 
Medina, 521 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1974); State v. Overton, 562 
P.2d 726, 114 Ariz. 553 (1977). 
In the case at bar, Mr. Oster and Mr. Yengich, 
lay witnesses whose testimonies were refused, were both 
basing their opinions on observations made sometime after 
the crime. Mr. Oster visited with the appellant on only 
two occasions, the first such occasion being over four 
months after the crime (R.152). The total time he spent 
with the appellant was only two and one quarter hours. 
Mr. Yengich had periodic visits with the appellant over 
a two and one half month period. However, his first visit 
with the appellant was not until nearly seven weeks after 
the crime had been committed. Neither witness was quali-
fied to offer an opinion as to the appellant's sanity at 
the time of the crime, which was the only issue in the 
trial. 
-a-
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In Medina, supra, the Colorado court found that 
where an investigator had visited with the defendant some 
two months after the crime and for thirty to forty-five 
minutes on one occasion, and forty-five to fifty minutes 
on five or six other occasions, the trial court had abused 
its discretion in permitting the non-expert investigator's 
opinion as to sanity. The arresting officer in Robinson, 
supra, apprehended the defendant within one hour after the 
crime was committed, and was allowed to offer his opinion 
as to the defendant's sanity. State v. Prewitt, 452 P.2d 
500, 104 Ariz. 326 (1969), is based on virtually identical 
facts, and again the lay testimony was admitted. The lay 
witnesses in State v. Randol, 513 P.2d 248, 212 Kan. 461 
(1973), were permitted to offer their opinions as to 
defendant's sanity where their observations were made 
soon after the offense. 
In the Utah case of State v. Robert Wayne Gleason, 
405 P.2d 793, 17 u.2d 150 (1965), the court stated that 
where two psychiatrists examined the defendant two months 
after the crime, and diagnosed him as being schizophrenic-
paranoic at that time, that such a diagnosis "does not 
prove anything as to his mentality two months before," at 
794. In a non-criminal case, the Utah court in In Re 
Hansen's Will, 167 Pac. 256, 50 Utah 207 (1917), had 
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another chance to examine lay testimony as to sanity, and 
stated at 261 that " ••• the facts upon which the opinion 
is based should not be too remote in point of time." 
Wigmore on Evidence, § 233, addresses the problem 
in this manner: 
"There seems to be no agreed 
definition of the limit of time 
within which such prior or subse-
quent condition is to be considered; 
and in the nature of things no 
definition is possible. The circum-
stances of each case must furnish the 
varying criterion, and the determination 
of the trial judge ought to be allowed 
to control." 
The appellant does not contend that the lay 
witnesses can offer their opinion as to his sanity at the 
time of the crime. Any evidence or opinions that they 
might render would only reflect on the appellant's 
condition at the time he was observed, and would be 
offered only for the jury to weigh on that point. Under 
the Ucah Rules of Evidence, Rule 45, the trial judge 
has discretion in admitting evidence to trial. The Utah 
court in In Re Hansen, supra, noted that in this area 
"that no hard and fast rule can be laid down governing 
all cases." Id. at 262. In Medina, supra, the Colorado 
Court recognized the judge's discretion in receiving 
non-expert opinion testimony. The trial judge has a duty 
to make adequate inquiry as to the opportunity and knowledge 
-10-
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of the witness to form the opinion, and use his discretion 
in permitting the witness to testify. State v. Lujan, 
534 P.2d 1112, 87 N.M. 400 (1975). 
In the case at bar, the witnesses whose 
testimony was refused were both basing their opinions 
on observations made some time after the crime. Mr. 
Oster visited with the appellant on only two occasions, 
the first such occasion being over four months after the 
crime (R.152). The total time he spent with the appellant 
was only two and one quarter hours. Mr. Yengich had 
periodic visits with the appellant over a two and one half 
month period. However, his first visit with the appellant 
was not until nearly seven weeks after the crime had been 
committed. Neither witness was qualified to offer an opinion. 
The trial judge acted properly in view of the 
existing case law, and within the limits of his discretion 
in disallowing the proffered evidence as being too remote 
and immaterial. 
POINT III 
THE EXCLUSION OF THE PROFFERED LAY WITNESS 
TESTIMONY AS TO APPELLANT'S SANITY WAS NOT ERRONEOUS, AND 
EVEN IF THE EVIDENCE WAS ADMISSIBLE, THE JUDGE'S REFUSAL 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
-11-
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Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence discusses 
the discretion of the judge in excluding evidence if he 
finds its "probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the risk that its admission will (a) necessitate undue 
consumption of time, or (b) create substantial danger of 
undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading 
the jury. n 
As was discussed in Point II of Respondent's 
Brief, the issue at trial was the appellant's sanity at 
the time the crime was corrunitted. The proffered testimony 
dealt only with the appellant's sanity at a later time, 
and was not material. 
During the course of the trial, two expert 
witnesses were called to testify as to their opinion 
of the appellant's sanity at the time they examined him 
(R.125,201), and at the time of the crime (R.130,202). 
The evidence that appellant sought to introduce through 
his p:;.:offer was merely cumulative of other evidence that 
had been or was presented. In State v. Zumalt, 451 P.2d 
253 at 256, 202 Kan. 595 (1969), the court stated: 
". • • the rule is that, generally, 
any error in the exclusion of evidence 
is cured when the same, or substantially 
the same, evidence is, through the same 
or other witnesses, subsequently admitted." 
-12-
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Where the excluded evidence, viewed in light of all the 
testimony presented, is merely cumulative, there is no 
reversible error. Fry v. State, 529 P.2d 521 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1974); People v. Thompson, 285 P.2d 958 (Cal. 1955). 
The appellant claims that the proffered evidence 
should have been admitted under Rule 63(1) (c), Utah Rules 
of Evidence, as being supportive of Dr. Whitten'sreference 
to the appellant's delusional system. However, the system 
was referred to by three witnesses other than Dr. Whitten 
during the trial. Pat Smith, a detective for the Salt Lake 
City Police Department read from the appellant's July 18 
confession in which he referred to the system (R.116,117). 
Dr. Van Austin, the State's expert, made note of the fact 
that the appellant had referred to the system in interviews 
he conducted (R.201). The appellant himself referred to the 
system (R.187). In short, there was more than enough 
evidence to allow the jury to make an informed decision on 
the appellant's sanity. 
Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence, states: 
"A verdict or finding shall not 
be set aside, nor shall the judgment 
or decision thereon be reversed, by 
reason of the erroneous exclusion of 
evidence unless ••• (b) the court 
which passes upon the effect of the 
-13-
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error or errors is of the opinion 
that the excluded evidence would 
probably have had a substantial 
influence in bringing about a 
different verdict or finding." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The excluded evidence was not material to the issue at 
trial. There was evidence from four witnesses on the 
appellant's sanity at a later date. The exclusion of 
the evidence in this case did not constitute reversible 
error. "It is only where there has been error which is 
both substantial and prejudicial to the rights of the 
accused that a reversal is warranted." State v. Neal, 
262 P.2d 756, at 759, 1 Utah 2d 122 (1953). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial judge acted properly in asking 
----
questions of the appellant's expert witness and in 
excluding the proffered testimony as being immaterial and 
remote in time. The appellant's rights have not been 
substantially prejudiced. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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